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Abstract  22 
Paranormal beliefs (PBs) are common in adults. There are numerous psychological 23 
correlates of PBs and associated theories, yet, we do not know whether such correlates 24 
reinforce or result from PBs. To understand causality, we developed an experimental 25 
design in which participants experience supposedly paranormal events. Thus, we can test 26 
an event’s impact on PBs and PB-associated correlates (Mohr, Lesaffre, & Kuhn, 2018). 27 
Here, 419 naïve students saw a performer making contact with a confederate’s deceased 28 
kin. We tested participants’ opinions and feelings about this performance, and whether 29 
these predicted how participants explain the performance. We assessed participants’ PBs 30 
and repetition avoidance (PB related cognitive correlate) before and after the 31 
performance. Afterwards, participants rated explanations of the event and described their 32 
opinions and feelings (open-ended question). Overall, 65% of participants reported 33 
having witnessed a genuine paranormal event. The open-ended question revealed distinct 34 
opinion and affect groups, with reactions commonly characterized by doubt and mixed 35 
feelings. Importantly, paranormal explanations were more likely when participants 36 
reported their feelings than when not reported. Beyond these results, we replicated that 37 
1) higher pre-existing PBs were associated with more psychic explanations (confirmation 38 
bias), and 2) PBs and repetition avoidance did not change from before to after the 39 
performance. Yet, PBs reminiscent of the actual performance (spiritualism) increased. 40 
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Results showed that young adults easily endorse PBs and paranormal explanations for 41 
events, and that their affective reactions matter. Future studies should use participants’ 42 
subjective experiences to target PBs in causal designs (e.g., adding control conditions).  43 
Keywords 44 




 Introduction  47 
Paranormal beliefs (PBs) are common in the Western world, whether assessed in children 48 
or adults (Hutson, 2012; Knittel & Schetsche, 2012; Moore, 2005; Rice, 2003). Broadly 49 
speaking, PBs include superstitious, paranormal, extra-terrestrial, religious, spiritual, and 50 
supernatural beliefs (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Developmental studies have shown 51 
that PBs are dominant in childhood when children often mix up fantasy and reality 52 
(Subbotsky, 2004a; Woolley, 1997). Various well-known authors placed the abundance 53 
of PBs to what Piaget coined as the preoperational stage of childhood (Freud, 1950; 54 
Piaget, 1928, 1929; Werner, 1948). Accordingly, PBs should disappear, or at least 55 
diminish, as the child becomes older. The critical period for PBs to disappear – making 56 
room for critical and scientific thinking – should occur around six years of age (Piaget, 57 
1929; Subbotsky, 2000, 2004b; Woolley, 1997). Yet, these assumptions do not match 58 
reality, because PBs are frequent in adulthood (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Subbotsky, 59 
2004b). We developed an experimental design to help understand the causal mechanisms 60 
that explain the persistence and/or formation of PBs in adulthood (see Mohr, Lesaffre and 61 
Kuhn, 2018, for the theoretical rational). In this design, participants witness a supposedly 62 
paranormal event. We assessed whether the variables of interest changed from before to 63 
after the event; and we also measured psychological variables that might predict whether 64 
people explain the event in paranormal terms.  65 
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Previous studies have shown that PBs vary depending on situation and context. 66 
For instance, adults provided more paranormal explanations when situations were 67 
stressful (Keinan, 1994) and/or uncontrollable (Langer, 1975). Also, others have shown 68 
that verbal suggestions could increase the extent to which participants reported 69 
paranormal experiences when witnessing a “séance” (Wiseman, Greening, & Smith, 70 
2003) or psychokinetic phenomena (i.e. alleged psychic ability allowing a person to 71 
influence a physical object without physical interaction; Wiseman & Greening, 2005). 72 
Moreover, increases in PBs or PB-related behaviors have been observed when the denial 73 
of the paranormal might have negative consequences (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002). 74 
Finally, participants may explicitly state that they do not believe in the paranormal, but 75 
their behavior suggests that they implicitly consider the possibility of paranormal events 76 
(see also Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002). Such studies indicate 77 
that (1) situations and context influence the extent to which PBs are acknowledged, and 78 
(2) a range of different measurements might be required to elicit PBs, for example, 79 
explicitly asking about beliefs (PBs), but also testing PB-related behavior.  80 
Standardized PB questionnaires allow us to measure people’s explicit  PBs (Prike, 81 
Arnold, & Williamson, 2017; Thalbourne & Delin, 1993). Likewise, we can assess PB-82 
related behavior with cognitive measures that have previously been associated with 83 
enhanced PBs. Examples of such measures include (1) tasks that show a tendency to 84 
easily associate things or events (Bressan, 2002; Rogers, Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2011; Rogers, 85 
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Qualter, & Wood, 2016), (2) the propensity to see meaningful patterns in random noise 86 
(Blackmore & Moore, 1994; Brugger et al., 1993; Riekki, Lindeman, Aleneff, Halme, & 87 
Nuortimo, 2013), (3) attenuated reasoning abilities (Denovan, Dagnall, Drinkwater, & 88 
Parker, 2018; Lawrence & Peters, 2004; Lindeman & Svedholm‐Häkkinen, 2016), and 89 
(4) repetition avoidance (Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990). Brugger et al. (1990) 90 
assessed repetition avoidance by asking participants to repeatedly imagine throwing a 91 
dice and to report the number they imagined on top of the dice (mental dice task). 92 
Participants high, as compared to low, in PBs showed a stronger repetition avoidance 93 
(i.e., they avoided stating sequences of identical numbers). The authors argued that this 94 
repetition avoidance represents participants’ propensity to underestimate chance, and thus 95 
to see meaning in randomly occurring events. 96 
This mental dice task has been used to assess PB-related behavior in studies that 97 
have used staged paranormal demonstrations to investigate the causal link between 98 
cognitive biases and paranormal beliefs (Lesaffre, Kuhn, Abu-Akel, Rochat, & Mohr, 99 
2018; Mohr, Koutrakis, & Kuhn, 2015). In these classroom studies, participants saw a 100 
performance of paranormal nature (see also Benassi, Singer, & Reynodls, 1980; Mohr et 101 
al., 2018), and the researchers assessed individuals’ PBs (Tobacyk, 2004) and repetition 102 
avoidance using a mental dice task (MDT; Brugger et al., 1990) before and after the 103 
performance. Participants were also asked to indicate the extent to which they explained 104 
the experience in psychic, conjuring, and religious terms. These studies showed that pre-105 
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existing PBs (assessed before the performance) correlated with more pronounced psychic 106 
event explanations after the performance (Mohr & Kuhn, 2020). However, these previous 107 
studies used relatively simple conjuring tricks (Benassi et al., 1980), which resulted in 108 
relatively low levels of paranormal explanations. We therefore replaced these simple 109 
tricks with a routine that had a stronger paranormal nature: a medium making contact 110 
with a confederate’s deceased kin.  111 
When using this stronger paranormal routine, psychic and conjuring explanations 112 
were prevalent of comparable frequency (studies 2 and 3 in Lesaffre et al., 2018). 113 
However, these studies did not report significant increases in either PBs or repetition 114 
avoidance from before to after the performance. However, they did reveal that many 115 
participants seemed confused by the performance and simultaneously endorsed psychic 116 
and conjuring explanations. Lesaffre et al. (2018) additionally noted that the performance 117 
elicited strong affective responses. In light of these latter observations, the current study 118 
focused on participants’ confusion and affect. We examined whether these factors 119 
correlate with how participants experience supposedly paranormal events. For affectivity, 120 
we have some indication for its importance on beliefs (Frijda, Manstead, and Bem (2000). 121 
For instance, PBs provided explanations for the unknown (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; 122 
Wyer & Albarracín, 2005), a sense of control (Boden & Gross, 2013), or helped to 123 
manage one’s stress (Keinan, 2002; Mascaro & Rosen, 2006; Tuck, Alleyne, & 124 
Thinganjana, 2006).  125 
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Our students experienced a performer in the classroom who allegedly contacted 126 
the deceased kin of a confederate (see Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015). Before 127 
and after the performance, we assessed PBs using a standardized PB questionnaire 128 
(Tobacyk, 2004) and repetition avoidance using the mental dice task (Brugger et al., 129 
1990). After the performance, participants indicated the extent to which they explained 130 
the performance in psychic, conjuring, and religious terms (see also Lesaffre et al., 2018; 131 
Mohr et al., 2015). Most importantly, we asked participants to report on their opinions 132 
and feelings about the performance. We used an open-ended question to assess 133 
participants’ spontaneous accounts. We used “open coding” (Glaser & Strauss, 1968) as 134 
well as “clustering” or “theme identification” (Miles & Huberman, 1994) to determine 135 
recurrent themes. Having these themes, we could test which opinions and feelings were 136 
associated with participants’ endorsement of paranormal explanations. In addition, we 137 
expected, first, to replicate that pre-existing PBs correlate with more psychic explanations 138 
after the performance (Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015). Second, we expected no 139 
change in PBs or repetition avoidance (Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015), but PBs 140 
reminiscent of the performance (i.e., spiritualism subscale; R-PBS spiritualism scores) to 141 
increase from before to after the performance. The later prediction was based on the 142 
observation that people endorsed particular beliefs after having experienced an event that 143 
most closely resembled these beliefs (French & Wilson, 2007; Glicksohn, 1990; Irwin, 144 
Dagnall, & Drinkwater, 2013; Lan, Mohr, Hu, & Kuhn, 2018).  145 
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Materials and methods 146 
Participants 147 
We recruited 419 first-year psychology undergraduate students (291 females) at a 148 
University in the French speaking part of Switzerland. Their mean age (in years) was 20.5 149 
(SD = 3.07; range 18-47). Participants were recruited in the classroom after an 150 
introductory social psychology lecture. The experiment was conducted directly after the 151 
recruitment in the same classroom.  152 
Swiss Law does not require ethical confirmation for this type of study. Yet, as 153 
detailed in the general procedure section, the current study was performed in accordance 154 
with the ethical standards described in the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later 155 
amendments or comparable ethical standards (World Medical Association, 2013).  156 
Self-report Measures 157 
Paranormal belief questionnaire 158 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (R-PBS; Tobacyk, 2004). We used its validated 159 
French version (Bouvet, Djeriouat, Goutaudier, Py, & Chabrol, 2014). This 26-item self-160 
report questionnaire consists of seven subscales including Traditional Religious Beliefs 161 
(e.g., “There is a heaven and hell”), Psi (“A person’s thoughts can influence the 162 
movement of a physical object”), Witchcraft (e.g., “Witches do exist”), Superstition (e.g., 163 
“Black cats bring bad luck”), Spiritualism (e.g., “It is possible to communicate with the 164 
dead”), Extraordinary Life Forms (e.g., “The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists”), 165 
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and Precognition (e.g., “The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future”). Participants 166 
answered each item along a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 167 
(strongly agree). Accounting for one reversely coded item, the scores were averaged so 168 
that higher scores reflect greater PB. Regarding R-PBS psychometrics qualities, Tobacyk 169 
(2004) reported adequate validity and a satisfactory reliability. Drinkwater, Denovan, 170 
Dagnall, and Parker (2017) recently assessed R-PBS dimensionality and factorial 171 
structure. They found that the seven factors (as described above) as well as the global 172 
factor (R-PBS total) best explained the data. In the current study, we calculated the R-173 
PBS total scores and the R-PBS spiritualism scores. Cronbach alpha reliability for the R-174 
PBS total scores was excellent for both pre (α = .89) and post (α = .91) measures, and 175 
acceptable to good for R-PBS spiritualism scores pre (α = .74) and post (α = .81) 176 
measures. These results are close to what Drinkwater et al. (2017) found in their study, 177 
for R-PBS global score (α = .93) and Spiritualism (α = .83), respectively.  178 
Event explanation scores 179 
We asked participants whether the performance was accomplished through (1) 180 
paranormal, psychic, or supernatural powers (psychic explanation), (2) ordinary magic 181 
trickery (conjuror explanation), or (3) religious miracles (religious explanation) using a 182 
7-point Likert scale [1 for strongly disagree to 7 for strongly agree; (Lesaffre et al., 2018; 183 
Mohr et al., 2015)]. 184 
Assessment of participants’ overall impression of the performance 185 
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Participants were asked about their general impression of the performance using the 186 
following open question: "Please indicate your feelings and opinions about the 187 
performance you have just seen.” Participants then freely formulated their answers. 188 
Answers were later coded for content (see qualitative data section). 189 
Repetition avoidance using the Mental dice task (Brugger et al., 1990).  190 
Participants received written and verbal instructions to imagine throwing a dice each time 191 
they heard a beep and to write down the number that they imagined being on top of the 192 
dice (66 trials). Computer-generated beeps were played 66 times at one second intervals, 193 
during which participants wrote down the imagined number. We calculated the number 194 
of first order repetitions (e.g. 1-1, 2-2, 3-3). If numbers were generated randomly, the 195 
number of repetitions would average 10.8 (page 461 in Brugger et al., 1990). While 196 
people in general produce less repetitions than expected by chance, this repetition 197 
avoidance is stronger in believers of the paranormal than in sceptics (Brugger et al., 198 
1990).  199 
Magic Performance 200 
The performance closely resembled the performance described in Lesaffre et al. (2018; 201 
Study 2 and 3). To be as ambiguous as possible about the performer (avoiding the 202 
impression of an experienced stage magician or psychic), the performance accentuated 203 
the performer’s and the confederate’s discomfort of being on stage, non-professionalism, 204 
and affectivity. Specifically, a semi-professional magician (Gregory) performed the 205 
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event. Gregory is a member of the FISM (International Federation of Magical Society) 206 
club of Geneva (www.lecmg.ch). He specializes in mentalism. We did not use magic 207 
props, such as cards or coins. The performance consisted of two parts. First, the performer 208 
aimed to guess the color a volunteer had selected. The volunteer received a dice with 209 
colors on the dice’s sides. Hidden from Gregory, the volunteer turned the dice so that the 210 
selected color was shown on top. Due to unexpected technical problems with the dice, 211 
this part of the performance was initiated, but not completed. Afterwards, the performer 212 
invited a confederate from the audience to join him. This female confederate was asked 213 
to think about one of her deceased close family members, in order to get in touch with 214 
him or her. The performer, after “having felt” a presence, started to “guess” details about 215 
the deceased person. Gregory reported more details about this person’s life as the 216 
performance continued. These details were “almost accurate” (e.g., Gregory guessed that 217 
the family member’s name was Michel, but it was actually Michael). As the performance 218 
continued, the confederate became increasingly emotional. The performer finished the 219 
performance by telling the young woman that her father loves her, that he was very proud 220 
of her, and that he would always look after her.  221 
Experimental Manipulation and General Procedure  222 
At the end of the introductory lecture on social psychology, the experimenter (LL) invited 223 
participants to partake in the experiment. The experiment was unrelated to the 224 
introductory lecture. Those who stayed for the experiment received only general 225 
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information concerning the procedure. Participants were then invited to sign a consent 226 
form. A professional camera team filmed the procedure for subsequent research and 227 
presentation purposes. We specified where students would have to sit if they wished to 228 
remain outside the reach of the camera during the experiment. After the students took 229 
their preferred seats, they were given a work booklet that contained the study material. 230 
They were invited to open the first page of the booklet where they received general study 231 
information that was concurrently given in oral form by the experimenter (LL). They 232 
were also instructed to refrain from communicating with fellow students throughout the 233 
experiment (see supplementary material for the detailed instructions). Immediately 234 
afterward, participants filled out the PB questionnaire (Tobacyk, 2004). Following this, 235 
they were asked to perform the mental dice task (MDT; Brugger et al., 1990). Once 236 
completed, we gave additional oral information and instructions about the upcoming 237 
performance (see supplementary material for details on this oral information). After the 238 
performance, the students were asked to perform the mental dice task again (Brugger et 239 
al., 1990). Subsequently, they were asked to complete the event explanation questions, 240 
the PB questionnaire (Tobacyk, 2004), and finally the open question. After completing 241 
the experiment, participants received a short debrief in writing, and a full debrief in 242 
person, one week later.  243 
Data Treatment 244 
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Of the original 418 participants, 390 participants were retained for subsequent analysis. 245 
Of those participants discarded, 11 booklets were empty, three participants did not 246 
provide signed consent, and 13 participants had missing answers. Another participant was 247 
excluded because the person knew the confederate and was familiar with the experiment.  248 
For the R-PBS analysis, we excluded participants who had at least one missing 249 
item before, after, or at both measurements reducing the total sample size to 338 250 
participants. For repetition avoidance, we applied the same reasoning, and excluded 251 
participants who had at least one missing value before, after, or at both measurements 252 
reducing the sample size to 332 participants (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). 253 
Quantitative data  254 
According to a previous observation (Lesaffre et al., 2018), we accounted for confusion 255 
in the explanation ratings (appreciating conjuring and psychic explanations at the same 256 
time). We grouped participants into four explanation groups, according to whether they 257 
interpreted the event either as predominantly psychic, conjuring, using both explanations 258 
(confusion), or neither (see also Lesaffre et al., 2018). We did not consider religious 259 
explanations, because they were rare. We used the following criteria:  260 
Psychic explanation group: participants rated the performance as being 261 
conducted by a genuine psychic. Scores were either >4 for psychic explanation, ≤4 for 262 
conjuror explanation, or both ≥4 for psychic explanation and <4 for conjuror one. 263 
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Conjuror explanation group: participants rated the performance as being 264 
conducted by a conjuror. Scores were >4 for conjuring explanation, ≤4 for psychic 265 
explanation, or both ≥4 for conjuror explanation and <4 for psychic explanation. 266 
Confusion explanation group: participants rated the performance as being 267 
conducted by a psychic and conjuror at the same time. Scores were ≥4 for both 268 
explanations. 269 
Neither explanation group: participants rated the performance as being neither 270 
done by a psychic nor a conjuror, with scores equal to or below 4 for both explanations. 271 
Qualitative data  272 
To code the responses to the open question, we coded the responses twice, once on 273 
opinion and once on feelings. For the actual coding, we had several trained raters (LL, 274 
DR, CD). A senior researcher with expertise in such coding (DJ) supervised the coding 275 
procedure, while being naïve to our study question.  276 
Opinion groups   277 
A priori, we were interested in whether participants would report that they were confused 278 
and also whether their own words would match the pre-determined themes as assessed 279 
by the event explanation scores (see also Benassi et al., 1980). In addition, we considered 280 
that this open question would reveal additional themes.  281 
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We first used the responses of a randomly chosen subgroup of participants (n = 282 
100). We identified the presence of the three main themes, namely “Conjuror,” “Psychic,” 283 
“Religious.” During this first coding round, we identified a new group of responses, that 284 
is, responses we could not interpret (e.g., unclear formulations and/or content). We 285 
labelled these responses as “rater cannot determine.” Next, we tested the usefulness of 286 
our codes looking at the responses from a new group of 100 participants. We found no 287 
additional themes. We concluded that the saturation point had been reached and that our 288 
codes were adequate for coding the data. Pairs of raters were responsible for the final 289 
coding starting again with the complete response set. The results of the final coding 290 
showed a moderate interrater reliability, with a Kappa value of κ = .675. To account for 291 
chance ratings, we weighted raters’ decisions when calculating this Kappa value (Cohen, 292 
1968): we weighted zero when the raters agreed, we weighted the ratings as 1 when the 293 
raters’ decisions differed slightly (doubts-only versus doubt-bias-conjuror, doubts-only 294 
versus doubt-bias-psychic, psychic versus doubt-bias-psychic, conjuror versus doubt-295 
bias-conjuror), and weighted the ratings as 2 when the raters’ decisions differed 296 
substantially (psychic versus conjuror). Disagreements were resolved through discussion. 297 
Further information on the final coding system including major categories, subcategories, 298 
and examples are given in the supplementary material.  299 
Conjuror group: Participant reports that the performance has been realized by a 300 
magician / actor rather than a genuine psychic. We included participants who reported 301 
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that the performance was possible due to the performer’s psychological abilities (not 302 
alluding to psychic powers or abilities).  303 
Psychic group: Participant reports that the performance has been realized by a 304 
genuine psychic or someone who has a special gift.  305 
Religious: Participant believes the performance was accomplished thanks to the 306 
power of god or another divine entity (djinn, devil, etc.) 307 
Doubts: Participant does not know what to think of the performance. The 308 
participant hesitates to conclude between a genuine psychic or an actor. Despite these 309 
doubts, the participant tends towards one position more so than to another. The group 310 
“doubts-bias-psychic” includes participants who expressed doubts but tended towards a 311 
psychic explanation. The group “doubts-bias-conjuror” includes participants who 312 
expressed doubts but tended towards a fake psychic or actor. Finally, when participants 313 
did not take any position, they were included in the “doubts-only” group. 314 
Rater cannot determine: The formulations and descriptions of the responses 315 
were such that the raters could not determine if the participant thought the performance 316 
was conducted by a genuine psychic, a conjuror/actor or through a religious miracle. 317 
Likewise, responses did not identify new themes. 318 
Affect groups   319 
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We examined the affective reactions participants spontaneously expressed and decided to 320 
identify recurrent themes using a qualitative analysis approach influenced by “open 321 
coding” in grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1968) as well as “clustering” or “theme 322 
identification” as referred to in more eclectic approaches (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 323 
Toward this aim, we again selected responses from a randomly chosen subgroup of 324 
participants (n = 100). 325 
We observed that a large number of participants expressed affective reactions 326 
varying in valence, that is, positive and negative. We also observed that participants 327 
mentioned the affectivity of the experience but did not further specify valence. Other 328 
participants reported that the experience was positive or negative, while others did not 329 
mention any feeling. Next, we tested the usefulness of our codes looking at responses 330 
from a new group of 100 additional participants. We found no additional themes. We 331 
concluded that the saturation point had been reached and that our codes were adequate 332 
for coding the data. Pairs of raters were responsible for the final coding, starting again 333 
with the complete response set of 200 participants. The results of the final coding showed 334 
an excellent interrater reliability, with a Kappa value of κ = .864. We again weighted 335 
raters’ decisions when calculating the Kappa value (Cohen, 1968), to account for chance 336 
ratings. We weighted zero when the raters agreed, we weighted 1 when the raters’ 337 
decisions differed, and weighted 2 when raters provided a positive affect and a negative 338 
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affect rating. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. Further information on 339 
the final coding system and examples are given in the supplementary material.  340 
Positive affect: Participant expresses only positive affect (e.g., happiness, solace, 341 
compassion, curiosity, etc.) 342 
Negative affect: Participant expresses only negative affect (e.g., disturbed, fear, 343 
worry, uneasiness, stress, etc.) 344 
Unspecified affect: Participant indicates that the performance was highly 345 
emotional (not defining the affective experience) or shares the intensity of the affective 346 
experience (e.g., intense, strong, etc.)  347 
Mixed affect (e.g., moved, touched, surprised, impressed…): Participant 348 
expresses affect that is naturally ambiguous and mixed, in other words, affect that can be 349 
either positive or negative, or be both at the same time. We included participants who 350 
clearly expressed both positive and negative affect.  351 
No affect: participant’s response does not mention anything affective. 352 
Data analysis  353 
We first examined the data for normality using the Shapiro Francia Normality Test 354 
(Shapiro & Francia, 1972). Most of the variables were not normally distributed (p < .05). 355 
Given our large sample size, we nevertheless performed parametric statistics (Ghasemi 356 
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& Zahediasl, 2012), apart from using Spearman correlations. We also examined the data 357 
for outliers, but none were identified.  358 
To test whether pre-existing PBs correlate with post-performance explanation 359 
scores, we performed Spearman correlations between R-PBS scores (total, spiritualism) 360 
and the three explanation scores. To test whether explicit (R-PBS) or implicit (repetition 361 
avoidance) belief-related measures changed with the performance, we ran paired samples 362 
t-tests comparing repetitions in the mental dice task, R-PBS total scores, and R-PBS 363 
spiritualism scores before and after the performance.  364 
To test the way participants might confuse various levels of explanations (Lesaffre 365 
et al., 2018), we also examined how participants responded to the different event 366 
explanation scores. We were particularly interested in the proportion of participants 367 
having a clearly psychic, conjuring, or confused explanation, or no explanation, 368 
comparing the frequencies in these groups using chi-square comparisons. 369 
To account for the possibility that psychic explanations could be explained by 370 
participants’ confused and affective reactions after the performance, we compared 371 
explanation scores between (1) opinion groups (conjuror, psychic, doubt-bias-psychic, 372 
doubt-bias-conjuror, doubts-only), and (2) affect groups (positive, negative, unspecified, 373 
mixed, none). For each type of group, we conducted separate multivariate analysis of 374 
variance (MANOVA) on the three explanation scores. We used Pillai’s trace test statistic, 375 
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because of its robustness to model violations (Olson, 1976). Post-hoc pairwise 376 
comparisons were conducted using Tukey tests. Alpha levels were set at .05 for all 377 
statistical tests. 378 
Results  379 
Effect of pre-performance measures (R-PBS total, R-PBS spiritualism, repetition 380 
avoidance) on explanation scores (post-performance) 381 
The correlations between pre-performance measures and explanation scores showed the 382 
expected relationships such that belief scores (R-PBS total, R-PBS spiritualism) 383 
positively correlated with psychic explanation scores and negatively correlated with 384 
conjuring explanation scores (Table 1). R-PBS total scores also correlated positively with 385 
religious explanation scores. Repetitions before the performance correlated positively 386 
with conjuring explanation scores (Table 1). Additionally, psychic explanation scores 387 
correlated negatively with conjuring explanation scores, and correlated positively with 388 
religious explanation scores (Table 1).  389 
-PLEASE INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE- 390 
Comparing belief scores and repetition avoidance before and after the performance  391 
Paired sample t-tests showed no differences in R-PBS total score before and after the 392 
performance. However, there were significantly higher R-PBS spiritualism scores and 393 
significantly more repetitions after as compared to before the performance (Table 2).  394 
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Event explanation scores and groups  395 
Table 3 presents the event explanation scores (means and standard deviations), as well as 396 
how often the various explanation scores (range 1 to 7) were used (Table 3). In descriptive 397 
terms, the bold numbers show that a score of 7 was most frequently given for psychic 398 
explanations, while a score of 1 was most frequently given for conjuring and religious 399 
explanations, with another peak at the score of 4 (in italic, Table 3).  400 
The distributions of participants belonging to the psychic, conjuring, confusion, 401 
or neither explanation groups (Figure 1) were not evenly distributed, 𝜒2(3) = 372, p < 402 
.001. Individual comparisons using standardized residuals (Field, 2018) showed that the 403 
psychic explanation group was overrepresented (p < .001), the confusion and conjuror 404 
explanation groups were underrepresented (both p <  .001), and the neither group was not 405 
different from what would be expected by chance (p < .05).  406 
-PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 3 AROUND HERE- 407 
 408 
Groups resulting from the qualitative data  409 
Explanation scores between opinion groups 410 
We coded the following responses from 385 participants: 167 expressed doubts, 120 411 
talked clearly about a psychic event, and 60 about a conjuror event (see Figure 2). 412 
Responses from about 10% of the sample could not be interpreted (38 out of 347 413 
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responses, Figure 2). Moreover, of the participants who expressed doubts, about half had 414 
a preferred explanation (psychic: n = 45; conjuror: n = 30).  415 
The MANOVA tested how our pre-determined explanation scores varied 416 
according to what people freely reported (opinion groups). The major comparison was 417 
significant, Pillai’s trace, V= .61, F(5, 379) = 19.50 p < .001. Subsequent separate 418 
univariate analyses of variance on explanation scores were all significant; psychic 419 
explanation scores, F(5, 379) = 99.6, p < .001, conjuring explanation scores, F(5, 379) = 420 
7.46, p < .001, and religious explanation scores, F(5, 379) = 6.51, p < .001 (see also 421 
Figure 2).  422 
For psychic explanations scores (Figure 2A), pairwise Tukey comparisons 423 
showed that scores were lowest in the conjuror explanation group as compared to all other 424 
groups (all p-values <.001). The next lowest scores were found for the doubt-bias-425 
conjuror explanation group, which were significantly different from all other groups (all 426 
p-values < .001). Highest scores were found in the psychic group, which scored 427 
significantly higher than all other groups (all p-values < .001). The second highest scores 428 
were in the doubt-bias-psychic group, which scored significantly higher than the other 429 
groups (biggest p value = .02), with the exception of the rater cannot determine group (p 430 
= .37). Lastly, the rater cannot determine group and the doubt-only group were not 431 
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significantly different from each other (p = .97), but were significantly different from the 432 
other groups (highest p-value = .02).  433 
For conjuring explanation scores (Figure 2B), pairwise Tukey comparisons 434 
showed little differences between groups (all non-significant p-values > 0.05). Mean 435 
scores were all below 4.0. We found lower scores in the psychic group as compared to 436 
the doubt-only (p < .001), conjuror (p < .001), doubt-bias-conjuror (p = .008), and rater 437 
cannot determine (p = .004) groups.  438 
For religious explanation scores (Figure 2C), pairwise Tukey comparisons did not 439 
show many differences between groups (all non-significant p-values > 0.05). Mean scores 440 
were all below 4.0. We found lower scores in the conjuror group as compared to the 441 
doubt-only (p = .002), psychic (p < .001), and doubt-bias-psychic (p = .011) groups. Also, 442 
higher scores were found in the psychic, as compared to the doubt-bias-conjuror group (p 443 
= .031). 444 
-PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE- 445 
 446 
Explanation scores between affect groups 447 
From 387 participants who completed the open question, we had responses that we could 448 
code as follows: 225 expressed affective reactions, while 162 did not report their feelings. 449 
Eighty participants expressed affective reactions that conveyed a clearly valanced 450 
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experience (positive or negative), 24 reactions were unspecified, and 121 reactions 451 
conveyed mixed experiences (see Figure 3).  452 
This MANOVA tested whether pre-determined explanation scores differed 453 
between affect groups. The major comparison was significant, Pillai’s trace, V= .21, F(4, 454 
382) = 7.14, p < .001. Subsequent, separate univariate analyses of variance on explanation 455 
scores were significant: psychic explanation scores, F(4, 382) = 20.6, p < .001, conjuring 456 
explanation scores, F(4, 382) = 2.58, p = .037, and religious explanation scores, F(4, 382) 457 
= 2.95, p = .020.  458 
For psychic explanation scores (Figure 3A), Tukey tests showed that the no affect 459 
group yielded the lowest scores when compared to all other groups (all p-values < .02) 460 
(Figure 3). Moreover, scores were lower in the negative affect group when compared to 461 
the mixed affect group (p = .003) (Figure 3). For conjuring explanation scores, Tukey 462 
tests showed comparable scores between groups (all p-values > 0.05) apart from a lower 463 
score in the mixed affect group as compared to the negative affect group (p =.049). For 464 
religious explanation scores, Tukey tests showed comparable scores between groups (all 465 
p-values > 0.05) apart from a lower score in the no affect group as compared to the 466 
unspecified affect group (p = .022). 467 





Paranormal Beliefs (PBs) are frequent in the adult population, and numerous 471 
psychological variables that are associated with PBs have been reported (see e.g. French 472 
& Stone, 2013; Irwin, 2009; Vyse, 2013 for reviews). However, little is known about the 473 
causal mechanisms behind these variables, including their formation and persistence. In 474 
our study, participants were exposed to a supposedly paranormal event, and we assessed 475 
key measures before and after the event. Moreover, we examined the extent to which 476 
these baseline measures predict what people think and feel about the event. Our 477 
performance consisted of a medium making contact with a confederate’s deceased kin, 478 
and we observed that many participants were confused about the true nature of the 479 
performance and reported strong affective reactions (Lesaffre et al., 2018).  480 
We aimed to better understand the nature of both this confusion and emotional 481 
affect, and whether they predicted paranormal explanations. We directly asked about 482 
participants’ opinions and feelings about the staged medium demonstration. About 65% 483 
of our sample gave psychic explanations (see also Benassi et al., 1980). A more detailed 484 
analysis revealed that lower paranormal explanation scores were found in participants 485 
who (1) assumed, not surprisingly, that the performer was a conjuror, or doubted that the 486 
performer could have been a conjuror, and (2) did not report on affective feelings when 487 
answering to the open question.  488 
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Before discussing our major results on confusion and affect, we wish to highlight 489 
that we replicated previous findings on independent samples of United Kingdom students 490 
(Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015). We also found that higher R-PBS total scores 491 
correlated positively with psychic and religious explanation scores and negatively with 492 
conjuring explanation scores (Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015). We then replicated 493 
that psychic scores negatively correlated with conjuring explanation scores, and psychic 494 
explanation scores correlated positively with religious explanation scores (Lesaffre et al., 495 
2018; Mohr et al., 2015). Finally, we replicated that R-PBS total scores did not change 496 
from before to after the performance (Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015). On this 497 
background, it is interesting to note that R-PBS spiritualism scores were significantly 498 
higher after as compared to before the performance. This increase supports the 499 
importance of actual experiences in forming related paranormal beliefs (French & 500 
Wilson, 2007; Glicksohn, 1990; Irwin et al., 2013; Lan et al., 2018). 501 
We tested whether participants’ confusion and feelings might explain whether, 502 
and to what extent, participants endorse psychic explanations. When looking at the 503 
explanation groups, the largest group (about 65% of participants) considered that they 504 
saw a genuine psychic event. Only about a tenth of our participants indicated that they 505 
had witnessed a conjuring event. In the current study, a small proportion of participants 506 
(2%) endorsed both psychic and conjuring explanations, while about a quarter endorsed 507 
neither of these explanations. The latter group might have been uncertain what to think 508 
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about this experience. The coding of the open question showed that about half of all 509 
participants expressed doubts, with about a quarter favoring the notion that they saw a 510 
psychic, and another quarter that they saw a conjuror. About a third assumed having seen 511 
a psychic and about 15 percent having seen a conjuror. The coding of the affective 512 
reactions showed that about two thirds of the participants reported on their affective 513 
feelings. The remainder did not mention affective feelings. Also, about one third of all 514 
participants reported mixed affective feelings (positive and negative), while only a third 515 
expressed clearly negative or positive feelings. Overall, coding of the responses to the 516 
open question indicated that doubt and mixed feelings were widely shared reactions.  517 
When testing whether psychic explanations differed between opinion and affect 518 
groups, it is worth highlighting that psychic explanations were overall much higher than 519 
conjuring and religious explanations. Only psychic explanations ranged beyond the mid-520 
point on the 7-point Likert scale (see also Lesaffre et al., 2018). When now accounting 521 
for opinion and affect groups, psychic explanations were high in all opinion and affect 522 
groups, apart from relatively lower psychic explanation scores in the conjuror group, 523 
doubt-bias-conjuror group, and no affect group. In numbers, these groups represent a 524 
relatively small part of the sample. Most participants belonged to the psychic, doubts-525 
only, doubt-bias-psychic, rater cannot decide, positive affect, negative affect, unspecified 526 
affect, and mixed affect groups. It seems that participants who have alternative 527 
explanations (conjuror, doubt-bias-conjuror) about what they have just seen (a performer 528 
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talking to a deceased person) are also those who are less inclined to favor the obvious 529 
interpretation, that is, having seen a genuine psychic event. It also seems that less obvious 530 
explanations are more readily available to participants whose affective reactions are not 531 
the prevalent preoccupation when answering the brief question "Please indicate your 532 
feelings and opinions regarding the performance you have just seen.”  533 
Strong links between affective reporting and psychic explanations may be 534 
explained by previous studies that examined affectivity and PBs. Frijda et al. (2000) 535 
stressed that “[emotions] are at the heart of what beliefs are about” (pp. 3). The authors 536 
showed that feelings were expressed in many ways (positive, negative, unspecified, 537 
mixed). However, the situation and context of our experiment might have been 538 
experienced very differently among participants. Participants sat in a large classroom, 539 
peers sitting close, some might have focused on the slightly clumsy performer, others on 540 
the emotional confederate. Still others might have focused on their own fears and hopes. 541 
Previous studies have shown some people find PBs reassuring, since they can provide 542 
explanations for the unknown (Heine et al., 2006; Wyer & Albarracín, 2005). Indeed,  543 
PBs may provide a sense of control, even if illusory (Boden & Gross, 2013). In difficult 544 
situations, PBs enhance or preserve positive emotions, while diminishing negative ones 545 
(Boden & Gross, 2013). Some people also find PBs and spirituality useful when having 546 
to manage stressful life events (Keinan, 2002; Mascaro & Rosen, 2006; Tuck et al., 2006). 547 
It is therefore possible that the affective arousal, rather than the positive or negative 548 
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valence of the situation (Lazarus, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) facilitates psychic 549 
explanations.  550 
Our final observations concern the results of the mental dice task. First, more 551 
repetitions were associated with more conjuring explanations. Second, repetition 552 
avoidance was lower after as compared to before the performance. The first finding 553 
complements previous findings in that less repetitions were associated with higher PBs 554 
(Brugger et al., 1990; Lesaffre et al., 2018). The second finding is counter to our 555 
prediction (increase in repetition avoidance) (Bressan, 2002; Brugger et al., 1990), and 556 
different from previous, closely related studies that report no change in repetition 557 
avoidance from before to after the performance (Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015). 558 
It is possible that our reduction in repetition avoidance resulted from high levels of 559 
arousal. A large proportion of our participants reported high levels of arousal, which may 560 
have interfered with performing the mental dice task. As indicated by our qualitative 561 
coding, many participants reported on their emotions and doubts, which is likely to have 562 
drawn attention and engagement away from the mental dice task. Brugger, Monsch, 563 
Salmon, and Butters (1996) investigated random number generation in Alzheimer 564 
patients, and they posited that higher levels of repetitions in these patients may have 565 
resulted from impaired frontal executive functions, in particular attentional functions. As 566 
a result, a lack of task focus, may result in more repetitions. However, we do not wish to 567 
make a strong case for the finding on the mental dice task and our current explanation. 568 
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We report the mental dice task results for scientific transparency, and our preliminary 569 
interpretation of the data should be taken with caution. We have used the mental dice task 570 
in many published (e.g., Lesaffre et al., 2018; Mohr et al., 2015) and unpublished studies, 571 
and found rather inconsistent findings, which has made us rather uncertain about its 572 
reliability. 573 
Limitations and future challenges  574 
We examined belief and experience items using paranormal belief questionnaires, 575 
desirability effects, and the affectivity of the event. One limitation relates to our sample, 576 
which consisted of an intact group; thus this group of participants (i.e., a class) was 577 
established prior to the research. Therefore, the results might not be generalized to the 578 
wider public. Secondly, the questionnaire (R-PBS, Tobacyk, 2004) focused on beliefs 579 
rather than experiences. The participants experienced a supposedly paranormal event 580 
right in front of their eyes, and we might have obtained different results had we included 581 
belief questions that focus on people’s past paranormal experience, such as done for a 582 
recently published self-report questionnaire (Prike et al., 2017). Experiences might be 583 
relevant in other ways too. Total R-PBS scores did not increase after the performance, 584 
while R-PBS spiritualism scores did. When looking at item formulations, the wording for 585 
the R-PBS spiritualism scores were more related to participants’ experience than the 586 
questions in the other subscales. Our questionnaire findings could also reflect a 587 
desirability effect: participants might have answered in conformance with the 588 
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experimenter’s expectancy. Yet, to fully explain the results, participants would have 589 
needed to (1) know which items belonged to which subscale, and (2) remember how they 590 
had answered during their baseline questionnaire in order to increase their R-PBS 591 
spiritualism score. We doubt that participants applied such a strategy. To further support 592 
our view, while not quantified, the classroom was fully engaged in the performance. 593 
Many students stormed forward at the end of the experiment because they wanted to talk 594 
to the performer. They asked him about his skills, and whether he would be willing to use 595 
his skills for their purposes too.  596 
This brings us to the final point – the affectivity of the event. The qualitative 597 
analysis showed many affective reactions. Many participants reported feeling empathetic 598 
with our confederate (Emmanuelle) or our psychic (Gregory). They also reported being 599 
shocked by what they had experienced. Content coding revealed that participants reported 600 
on valanced reactions (negative or positive), mixed reactions (positive and negative), 601 
unspecified reactions (intense but ambiguous valence), or did not mention their affective 602 
reactions at all. The latter category was relatively frequent. However, not reporting on 603 
affective reactions does not imply that no affective reactions had occurred. Interesting in 604 
this regard, the no affect group scored closest to the negative affect group when looking 605 
at the event explanation scores. Perhaps, the no affect group had experienced negative 606 
affect, but refrained from reporting on these reactions. Such a possibility could be tested 607 
by formulating a priori questions, and by adding objective measures sensitive to variation 608 
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in affect. For instance, one could assess psychophysiological measures such as heart rate. 609 
In case such measures are used, their variation could be matched to variation in psychic 610 
explanations due to intense emotional arousal. As already noted above, the arousing 611 
character of the situation (Lazarus, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) might facilitate 612 
psychic explanations. If this suggestion is true, future studies could compare the current 613 
type of performance with a recently used performance of pseudo-psychological nature 614 
(Lan et al., 2018).  615 
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Table 1. Spearman correlation coefficient comparing pre-performance measures (R-799 
PBS total scores, R-PBS spiritualism scores, MDT repetitions with event explanation 800 
scores). 801 




          psychic conjuring 
Spiritualism  .77***     
MDT rep.  .06 .07    
Explanations psychic .42*** .33*** -.02   
 conjuring -.11* -.13* .14** -.23***  
  religious .27*** .09 .03 .33*** .06 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01.; * p < .05 ; R-PBS total= Revised Paranormal Belief Scale total scores; Spiritualism= 
R-PBS spiritualism scores; MDT rep.= Mental Dice Task repetitions (repetition avoidance).   
  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and results from paired sample t-tests comparing 802 
measures before and after the performance. 803 
  N Mean SD t value p value 
R-PBS total before 338 2.85 0.90 
.105 .916 
 after 338 2.85 0.97 
Spiritualism before 338 3.31 1.40 
6.169 <.001 
 after 338 3.60 1.58 
MDT repetitions before 332 5.60 4.93 
2.886 .004 
 after 332 6.22 5.55 
R-PBS total= Revised Paranormal Belief Scale total score; Spiritualism= R-PBS spiritualism scores; MDT 804 
repetitions= Mental Dice Task repetitions (repetition avoidance). 805 
  806 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and distribution of answers for explanation scores (psychic, 807 
conjuror, religious). The counts per scale score (1-7) are also shown. Bold numbers depict 808 
the lowest and highest possible scores of 1 and 7. The italicized numbers depict the mid-809 
score of 4.  810 
 Explanation N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No 
answer  
Psychic 388 4.69 2.13 55 33 6 79 35 69 111 2 
Conjuring 389 2.19 1.61 199 78 19 59 15 5 14 1 
Religious 389 1.94 1.53 253 39 16 50 15 11 5 1 
Scores from 1 to 7 refer to the prevalence of each Likert scale score for each explanation question.  
 
 
Figure 1. Proportions (%) of participants allocated to the different explanation groups 811 
according to their answers on both the psychic and conjuring explanation questions. 812 
Percentages do not add up to 100%, because two persons did not provide both the psychic 813 
and conjuring ratings.  814 




























Psychic Doubt-P Conjuror Doubt-C Doubt-O RCD
(n=92) (n=45) (n=60)                    (n=30)                   (n=92)                 (n=38)
A B C
Figure 2. Mean explanation scores as a function of opinions groups and as a function of 816 
psychic explanation scores (A), conjuring explanation scores (B), and religious 817 
explanation scores (C). Columns depict the opinion groups Psychic, Doubt-bias-psychic 818 
(Doubt-P), Conjuror, Doubt-bias-conjuror (Doubt-C), Doubt-only (Doubt-O), Rater 819 













Positive Negative Unspecified Mixed No affect
(n=15) (n=65) (n=24)                (n=121)           (n=162)        
A B C
Figure 3. Mean explanation scores as a function of affect groups and as a function of 822 
psychic explanation scores (A), conjuring explanation scores (B), and religious 823 
explanation scores (C). Vertical bars denote  one standard error of the means. 824 
825 
43 
 
 
